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Abstract 
Using individual-level data on registered unemployed collected by the Federal 
Employment Service in Voronezh province of Russia (1996-2000), we test some basic 
hypothesis on the influence of individual attributes (gender and education, in particular), 
working history, the specifics of the regulatory framework, and regional labor market 
characteristics on the hazard ratios, and hence, on duration of unemployment. We get 
empirical support to gender and educational differentials in unemployment duration: 
women tend to stay longer in the pool, and there are gender asymmetries in the 
influence of employment history on  unemployment duration; those with junior 
professional education have significantly higher exit rates from unemployment as 
compared with those with secondary general education, while secondary professional 
and university degrees do not help you leave unemployment. There appears to be a 
“premium” in terms of higher exit rate for males with experience at private enterprise, 
but not for females, while the configuration of the local labor market does matter for 
both: those living in municipalities with highly concentrated labor market tend to have 
longer unemployment spells. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the peculiarities of transition economies, including Russia, is the stagnant 
unemployment pool: the ratio of long-term unemployed in Russia’s unemployment pool 
is more than thirty per cent. The destabilizing effect of the phenomenon for social 
development is well known, as well as the fact that the effectiveness of various means 
to fight it depends crucially on the nature of the labor market.  
As many scholars note, unemployment in transition economies increased mainly due to 
a very low outflow from the unemployment rather than due to the high inflow into it, as 
opposed to developed economies. The unemployment inflow (the ratio of the increment 
in the number of the unemployed to the labor force) was around 0.5% per month as 
compared with 1% in Western Europe and 2-3% in the United States (Boeri (1998)). 
The outflow from unemployment was low: only 5 out 100 unemployed found jobs, and 
about one third of those exiting unemployment exit the labor force.  
An intensive movement of workers from one enterprise to another, i.e., without entering 
unemployment, is suggested as an explanation for the co-existence of long-term 
unemployment and developing private sector in transition economies (Brixiova (1997), 
Boeri (1999)). The reasons for this kind of behavior of employers are suggested to be 
mainly the discrepancy between the qualification profile of the unemployed and the 
relevant qualification profile of vacancies.   
Little is known, however, on who are those unemployed, and long-term unemployed in 
particular, and what are the factors that determine probabilities to exit unemployment 
and to re-enter it. The paper aims at improving our understanding of the issues for the 
Russian economy. In particular, we investigate transitions of registered unemployed 
into and out of unemployment using Federal Employment Service data and survival 
analysis framework. Proportional hazard models which allow to introduce economic 
factors which are most likely to explain duration of unemployment spells are estimated. 
The pool of registered unemployed is in the focus of our research. We use individual-
level data on registered unemployed collected by the Federal Employment Service in 
Voronezh province in 1996-2000. 
As a part of the project, we test whether there are differences in male/female patterns. 
We also expect  education level, family connections, employment history, properties of 
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regulatory arrangements and local labor market characteristics be important 
determinants of unemployment duration.  
Studying the unemployment structure, and survival analysis in particular, are popular 
topics of research (Van den Berg and van Ours (1994, 1996, 1998), van den Berg 
(2000), Micklewright and Nagy (1998), Partridge and Rickman (1998), and many 
others). Most empirical papers analyze developed economies, however, and there are 
only a few studies for Russia. It is mainly the lack of appropriate data that explains the 
scarcity.  
Speaking about the studies in transition countries, we should mention Lubyova and van 
Ours (1997a,b) who study unemployment duration and the influence of changes in 
benefit provision schemes in Slovakia using employment service data. The authors find 
positive dependence of hazard rate from the level of education. Ham, Svejnar and  
Terrell (1996) study unemployment pools  in the Czech and Slovak republics and find 
that males of senior ages with less education have less chances to exit unemployment.   
The issue of the influence of education  on the duration of unemployment spell in 
Russia is an open question yet. Foley (1997), using RLMS data for 1992-94, finds that 
those with university degree tend to have  relatively longer unemployment spells. 
Grogan and van den Berg (2000), using RLMS data for 1994-96, distinguished between 
four types2 of unemployment and estimated duration for each type separately. They find 
that those with university degree have relatively better chances to exit unemployment. 
Nivorozhkina et.al. (2000) study registered unemployment in Rostov-on-the-Don city, 
using the Federal Employment service data for the city, and find that less qualified are 
easier in finding jobs. 
With respect to gender differentials, it is widely believed that unemployment in Russia 
has a ‘female face’. The features of the face are not clear though: Grogan and van den 
Berg (2000) find that females tend to have higher frequency of unemployment spells as 
compared with males, with shorter duration of the spells;  Nivorozhkina et.al. (2000) 
find that females tend to be longer in unemployment than males. The sources of gender 
differences is to be explained as well: is it mainly the difference in qualification and 
experience or rather discrimination that increases the spell for females; or could getting 
registered be simply a way of getting access to the welfare program for those out of 
labor force (women)?  
                                                 
2 The authors defined unemployment as the state in which you “do not have work”, “do not have a job”, 
“are not paid for work”, “are unemployed according to ILO definition”.  
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The type of data and the approach we use in our study resembles those chosen by 
Nivorozhkina et.al. (2000). However, it is not only that the region is different, but the 
range of questions we are interested in is broader. Nevertheless, it is important that our 
results are compared with those in Nivorozhkina et.al.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces briefly the unemployment 
benefit provision rules and presents some statistics on Voronezh province. Section 3 
presents the methodology used and the data.  Results are presented in section 4. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. Unemployment benefit system in Russia: a brief overview 
An unemployment benefit system in general has two major functions: to provide 
insurance against becoming unemployed, and to provide social assistance to the long-
term unemployed. The Russian system3 is believed to be not successful in both of the 
tasks: the coverage ratio, i.e. the ratio of those getting unemployment benefit or 
unemployment assistance to the total number of unemployed, is rather low, 
unemployment benefits are very small, and unemployment assistance is practically non-
existent.  
One of the explanations of the low coverage ratio in Russia is the level of 
unemployment benefit: it is very low in comparison to both developed countries and the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe.  The average unemployment benefit was 20% 
of the average wage in 1995 and rose to 30% in 1997.  The same ratio was 40-60% in 
most Eastern European countries in the early 90-s and declined to about 35% by 1995.  
Half of the registered unemployed in Russia are eligible for the minimum UB, which is 
equivalent to 8% of the average wage or 20% of the subsistence level of a working 
person. The average UB amounts to only 30-50% of regional subsistence level.  
Widespread UB arrears reduce the size of effective UB even further.4  
The coverage ratio is not very high in OECD countries too - about 40%.  However, the 
reason for the low coverage ratio in Russia and in OECD countries is completely 
different.  In OECD countries it is UB eligibility restrictions, which result in effectively 
unemployed individuals not getting any benefit, while in Russia there is a large 
proportion of discouraged workers or unemployed reluctant to register with the 
                                                 
3 Some details on the piece of legislation could be found in Appendix.  
4 Thirty per cent of expenditure on UB provision in 1998 was to repay benefit arrears. 
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employment agency because they believe it will give them any advantages.  The 
benefits are small and paid irregularly, payment arrears are rampant,5 and the 
probability of finding a good job with the help of the employment agency is small, 
while the transaction costs of registration are too high.   
Social assistance in the form of monthly benefits is practically non-existent in Russia.  
This is a major difference with Eastern Europe, where social assistance is common and 
every unemployed person can get UA of infinite duration and of non-negligible 
magnitude.  While the Russian system looks certainly better from the point of view of 
distortions to the incentives to work, it is also much worse in terms of preventing the 
unemployed from falling into poverty6.  
Voronezh province is an interesting case to study unemployment in: first, the province 
is one of the largest provinces in central Russia; second, this is the province where a lot 
of defense-oriented manufacturing enterprises were situated during the Soviet era, and 
hence, the degree of structural discrepancies is believed to be very high in the region. 
However, there is still not too much of restructuring which is reflected in the pattern of 
regional production decline and regional unemployment (Table 1).   
Table 1. General and registered unemployment in Voronezh province 1992-98 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Real industrial production 
index (% to previous year) 
                 Russian Federation 
                 Voronezh oblast 
 
 
82 
87 
 
 
86 
88 
 
 
79 
62 
 
 
97 
88 
 
 
96 
85 
 
 
102 
102 
 
 
95 
90 
General unemployment (ILO) 
                  Russian Federation 
                  Voronezh oblast 
 
5.2 
4.7 
 
5.9 
4.4 
 
8.1 
5.6 
 
9.5 
8.2 
 
9.7 
9.2 
 
11.8 
8.1 
 
13.3 
9.5 
Registered unemployment 
                  Russian Federation 
                  Voronezh oblast 
 
0.8 
0.5 
 
1.1 
0.5 
 
2.3 
1.3 
 
3.3 
2.1 
 
3.6 
2.6 
 
2.9 
2.2 
 
2.9 
2.2 
Source: Goskomstat 
With respect to unemployment, Voronezh province followed the average RF pattern, 
though both registered and general unemployment rates were lower in Voronezh oblast 
as compared with all Russia level. Registered unemployment throughout the period was 
about 20-30% of ILO-based unemployment (both for the province and the country as a 
whole).  
                                                 
5 In some regions unemployment benefits are paid with an average delay of 12 months. In the 1996 round 
of RLMS, 51% of individuals, who said that they are entitled to unemployment benefits said that they did 
not receive unemployment benefits in the last month. 
6 The proportion of those in long-term unemployment (more than a year) in Russia is reported to amount 
to 30% of the unemployed.   
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It is sometimes believed that registered unemployment is not the phenomenon to look at 
since it is mainly low skilled workers or “marginal” social groups who keep staying in 
the registry. However, little empirical evidence is provided to support or to oppose the 
point of view, with the main reason being non-availability of data. We are lucky to have 
the data, and thus could get some answers to the question: “Who are those registered as 
unemployed, and long-term unemployed in particular?”.   
One of the interesting facts we obtain while looking at the registered unemployed data 
in the region is that there is only a slight downward shift in the educational structure in 
the pool of registered unemployed as compared to those employed, and a moderate shift 
into younger ages (Table 2). This is an argument against the aforementioned point of 
view which considers those in the registry as “marginal” people.   
In addition, we believe that it is important to study registered unemployment since: 
• Registered unemployed are about 20-30% of ILO-defined unemployed; 
• If it is long-term unemployed that are in the focus, then the pool of registered 
unemployed should be looked at since there is little rationale not to get 
registered when looking for a job for a long tome; 
• Labor market policies, both passive and active, are applied to those in the 
registry. Hence, to design a policy with predictable impact, one needs to look at 
the sample. 
Table 2. The comparative age and educational structures of the pools of the employed 
and the registered unemployed in the Voronezh province 
 Pool of registered 
unemployed 
Voronezh province 
summary statistics 
(Pool of employed) 
Age structure 
15-29 
30-49 
50-59 
60-70 
 
39% 
47% 
12% 
2% 
 
21% 
63% 
13% 
3% 
Education structure 
Basic general (9 years) 
General secondary 
Junior professional 
Secondary professional 
High professional (university) 
 
10% 
37.4% 
12.5% 
22.2% 
18% 
 
11.5% 
32% 
4.5% 
28% 
24% 
Source: Goskomstat and authors’ calculations   
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3. Methodology and data. 
3.1 Methodology 
The problem of fighting long-term unemployment is complicated by the fact that the 
longer a person is unemployed, the harder it  is for him to find a job, i.e., the probability 
to exit unemployment decreases as duration if unemployment spell increases. The latter 
is typically a combination of two effects: 
• The so-called heterogeneity effect: the unemployed are different with respect to 
their qualification, abilities, motivation, etc. Those possessing the most attractive 
from the labor market point of view set of attributes leave the unemployment 
pool the first. 
• The so-called spell duration effect: duration of the unemployment spell itself 
could affect the probability to find a new job.  
We should mention here that the policy implications would depend on the prevalence of 
this or that effect: if individual characteristics of the unemployed are the main factors 
behind the duration of the unemployment spell, then re-training programs should be 
chosen, while if the second effect dominate, the duration of unemployment spell itself 
needs to be the target. To distinguish between the two effects one needs to study the 
unemployment pool.  
The core methodology of our study is survival analysis (duration analysis). The 
approach allows to exploit the features of longitudinal data. The survey of the approach 
could be found in Kiefer (1988).   
The central idea of the approach is to estimate the so-called hazard ratios (exit 
functions), defined as the probability that the unemployment spell ends at time t 
conditional that the spell last till period t. Hazard ratio allow to define duration 
dependence: it is said to be positive (negative) at time t* if the hazard ratio is increasing 
(decreasing) around t*.   
One of the popular functional form used in the analysis is proportional hazard model 
which allow to analyze the influence of various economic factors on the duration of the 
unemployment spell. The general form of the model is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )txxt 00 ,,,, λβφλβλ = ,  
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where 0λ  - base hazard function, corresponding to ( ) 1=⋅φ , x - vector of explanatory 
variables, β - estimated coefficients.  
The following specification of ( )⋅φ  is typically used (mainly due to interpretation 
easiness): ( ) ( )ββφ 'exp, xx = . Under this specification coefficient β shows the 
(constant) effect of a change in x  on the change in conditional probability of the spell 
completion: ( ) βλβλ =∂∂ xxt /,,,ln 0 . Additionally, one of the most popular 
assumptions about the type of base hazard function is that it has Weibull distribution: 
( ) ( ) 1−= ptpt λλλ . If p>1 (p<1), then the probability to exit unemployment is positively 
(negatively) depends on the duration of the unemployment spell. When the base hazard 
function is left not specified, the Cox proportional hazard model is obtained. 
Along with proportional hazard models, there is another popular specification - the so-
called accelerated failure-time (AFT) model, where the natural logarithm of the survival 
time ln t is expressed as a linear function of the covariates: 
ln tj = xjβ +εj   , 
where xj  is a vector of covariates, βj   is a vector of regression coefficients, and εj is the 
error with density f(). Depending on the distributional form of the error term, lognormal 
model (f() - normal density function), log-logistic (f() - logistic density function) and 
some other models are obtained. In what follows, we try lognormal model. Unlike 
Weibull distribution, the lognormal distribution allows for non-monotonic hazard rates: 
initially increasing, and then decreasing rates. 
In what follows, we attempted three specifications: Box model, Weibull proportionate 
hazard model, and lognormal accelerated failure time model. 
The vector of explanatory variables x , which are supposed to influence the duration  of 
the unemployment spell, includes several groups of factors: 
• demographic (gender, age, marital status); 
• qualification (level of education, experience, including in the private sector); 
• the pre-unemployment state on the labor market (employed, out of the labor 
force, unemployed)  
• local labor markets characteristics 
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3.2 Data 
The database we use is based on entries in personal registration form (Form 1) collected 
in Voronezh city and Voronezh province by the Federal Employment service of the 
region for the years 1996-2000.  The information on the “treatment” provided for those 
registered is also available. The list of variables used in the study and the relevant 
summary statistics is presented  in Table 3. The database is enlarged so that to include 
local labor market characteristics obatined from CEFIR database on municipalities.   
The data are translated into survival format data with a week as time unit. STATA 
statistical software is used. All the estimation procedures used allow for censored from 
the right observations. 
Table 3. List of variables used in the study and the summary statistics 
 Sample characteristics Sample structure or mean 
Dummy for unemployment 
status 
Have status of unemployed 
Do not have the status 
72.4% 
27.6% 
Gender Male 
Female 
39% 
61% 
Age 16-19           
20-24 
25-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-54 
55-59 
≥60 
9.9% 
17.9% 
11.6% 
23.7% 
23.4% 
7.3% 
4.5% 
1.7% 
Marital status Married 
Not married 
Divorced/widow 
59% 
30% 
11% 
Education categories Basic general (9 years) 
General secondary 
Junior professional 
Secondary professional 
High professional (university) 
Post-graduate 
Additional professional 
10% 
37.4% 
12.5% 
22.2% 
17.8% 
0.1% 
0.1% 
Type of non-employment Redundant 
Lost job 
Long-term not employed 
Never worked before 
21% 
43.5% 
16.3% 
19.2% 
Sector of last employment Industry 
Agriculture 
Transport and communication 
Construction 
Sales and catering 
Communal services 
Utilities 
Management 
Science 
Other material branches 
31.3% 
5% 
6.6% 
7.3% 
12.2% 
3.1% 
2.3% 
1.4% 
1.8% 
19% 
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Healthcare 
Social protection 
Education 
Culture 
Credit and finance 
Insurance 
Defence 
Light industry 
2.5% 
0.5% 
3.6% 
0.5% 
1.5% 
0.1% 
0.5% 
0.5% 
Type of ownership of last 
employment 
State 
Non-state 
48% 
                 52% 
General experience In half years 8.9 
Experience within the last 
year before registering 
In months 7.5 
 
Dummy for getting 
registered after August 
1998 
Got registered after Aug98 
Got registered before Aug98 
53.2% 
46.8% 
Dummy for being in 
registry for more than 12 
months 
 
In the registry >12 month 
                        <=12months 
60.5% 
39.5% 
Reason for taking out of 
registry 
Got job or became 
entrepreneur 
Quit the registry or did not 
appear 
Retirement (include. early) 
Starts education 
Migration/army/elected 
Other reasons 
28.2% 
 
12.2% 
0.1% 
4.6% 
0.3% 
0.6% 
 
 
4. Results 
First, we looked at the characteristics of the sample and tested our guess that there are 
gender and educational differences in both the incidence rates and the survival 
time/hazard rates. Table 4 and graphs in Appendix summarise some results with respect 
to the distribution of survival time on the total sample and on the gender, education, age 
and pre-/after- crisis of 1998 sub-samples. The table and the graphs show that: 
• The average incidence rate for the whole sample is 0.02, and the medium 
registered unemployment spell is 36 weeks (about 8.5 months). 
• Males have higher incidence rate as compared with females, i.e., men tend to  
exit the pool of registered unemployed more often than women. Moreover, 
women have lower hazard rates7, or put it differently, have longer 
unemployment spells: the medium unemployment spell (survival time) of 
females is about 44 weeks (10 months), as compared to 25 weeks (6 months) for 
males.  
                                                 
7 Here we consider exiting to employment as “failure” event. In later versions we plan to consider exits to 
out of the labor force as well.  
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• There are substantial differences between different educational groups with 
respect to the survival time distribution. As is seen from the Table, those with 
junior professional education (edu 3) are relatively worse in exiting the pool at 
early times (their survival time is longer as compared with the first two groups), 
while performing relatively better later on.   
• Exit rates after August 1998 became higher. 
Table 4. Survival time summary statistics and incidence rates: total sample, gender and 
educational groups 
   Survival time (weeks) 
 Incidence 
rate 
Number of 
subjects 
25% 50% 75% 
Total sample 0.02 232549 12.3 35.7 68.7 
By gender 
   Males 
   Females 
 
0.026 
0.018 
 
  90570 
141975 
 
  8.3 
15.6 
 
25 
43.7 
 
57 
75.2 
By education groups 
 
Basic general 
General secondary 
Junior professional 
Secondary profess. 
University 
Post-graduate 
Additional profess. 
 
 
0.024 
0.022 
0.024 
0.017 
0.016 
0.020 
0.015 
 
 
22589 
85083 
28631 
51708 
41419 
   212 
   162 
 
 
 7.6 
 8.9 
11.1 
17.1 
18.1 
15.4 
22 
 
 
27.6 
30.9 
28 
43 
46.6 
35.4 
46.6 
 
 
68.3 
67.4 
57.4 
74.1 
73.1 
64.6 
95 
By age categories 
16-19           
20-24 
25-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-54 
55-59 
≥60 
 
0.029 
0.025 
0.022 
0.019 
0.018 
0.015 
0.014 
0.012 
 
20346 
41834 
27240 
54854 
54946 
17654 
10976 
 4699 
 
9.3 
9.4 
11 
13 
14 
16.4 
17.9 
17 
 
22.1 
26.7 
32 
38.6 
40.6 
51.3 
55.7 
85 
 
49.6 
56.9 
62 
65.9 
70.9 
85 
105.3 
227.9 
Before Aug98 
After   Aug98 
0.017 
0.024 
100771 
131778 
17.8 
8.1 
44.4 
28.4 
77.1 
61.4 
 
 
Table 5 reports the results of estimation of proportional hazard rates for the sample of 
registered unemployed since January 1996 to December 2000. Three model 
specifications were attempted: Box model, Weibull proportionate hazard model, and 
lognormal accelerated failure time model. The three specifications provide close 
estimates of the coefficients.  
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As is seen from the table, almost all the groups of explanatory variables are statistically 
significant.  In particular, holding other factors constant, we have the following results: 
• Younger people (up to 30) tend to exit unemployment quicker (the relevant 
hazard ratios are higher), while older ages tend to stay longer in the pool as 
compared to those of 30-39 years old. Notice, that, as Table 3 shows, the three 
broad age categories (young-medium-senior) are rather equally represented in 
the pool.  
• Females have significantly lower hazard rates as compared with males even after 
controlling for education, experience, marital status, etc.  
• There are differences in duration of unemployment spells based on educational 
differences: those with junior professional education have significantly higher 
exit rates from unemployment as compared with those with secondary general 
education. Moreover, secondary professional and university degrees do not 
make your chances to exit unemployment higher. One of the reasonable 
explanations for the finding suggests could be that the structure of vacancies 
suits workers with low qualification more.  
• Holding other factors constant, senior ages with low qualification tend to exit 
unemployment quicker (the relevant interaction term is weakly significant and 
positive). A lower reservation wage and, as a result, a higher acceptance rate, 
could be suggested as a rationale for this. 
• We get two different results with respect to experience: experience in the last 
year before registration at FES is (weakly) significant and positive, while 
general experience has significant negative influence on hazard rate. The finding 
suggests that most of the human capital accumulated by those who chose to 
register at FES is obsolete and is not required by the labour market. At the same 
time, being employed in recent periods is a “good” signal for employers, and 
thus facilitates exit from unemployment to employment. 
• Being granted the status of an unemployed, and thus (in most cases) a benefit , 
decreases hazard rate, though the coefficient is rather small. Hence, there is 
either a de-stimulating effect of the status of an unemployed, or, those who are 
granted the status do have some characteristics (other than experience, 
education, etc.) that result for them in staying longer in the pool. 
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• The so-called “type of non-employment” (the previous state in which a person 
was before getting into registry, with distinction between redundancy and loss of 
job), has some influence on the duration. Those who became redundant at their 
previous job has relatively lower exit rates (and hence, longer duration periods) 
as compared with those who lost their job, while entering the registry (and in 
this sense the labour force) after a long break (long-term not employed) or for 
the first time (those who never worked before) is not statistically significant  
(i.e., not difference with the reference category). The result for redundant 
workers could be related either to the better incentives to get registered (since 
they get redundancy payments), or to the less favourable individual 
characteristics or bad signals for potential employers. The differences in 
male/female patterns discussed below are of relevance here as well. 
 
Table 5. Estimation of proportional hazard models for the sample of non-employed 
registered at the FES, 1996-2000 
Explanatory  
                      Variables 
Hazard rate Hazard rate Hazard rate 
        Cox model 
Hazard      
Ratio         
                 
Weibull model 
Hazard       Coefficient 
Ratio           from AFT 
                    model  
Lognormal 
model^^ 
 
Coefficient     
Gender (1- female) -0.7936 
(0.0069)*      
-0.7923 
(0.0069)*     
 0.1322 
 (0.0049)*          
 0.15507 
 (0.0052)*          
Age1  (16-19) 1.2778  
(0.0560)* 
1.3348  
(0.0624)* 
-0.1640  
(0.0266)* 
-0.1645  
(0.0282)* 
Age2  (20-24) 1.1353  
(0.0176)* 
1.1484  
(0.0187)* 
-0.0786 
(0.0092)* 
-0.0806 
(0.0097)* 
Age3  (25-29) 1.0279 
(0.0131)* 
1.0388 
(0.0135)* 
-0.0216 
(0.0073)* 
-0.0114 
(0.0078) 
Age5  (40-49) - 0.9484 
(0.0095)* 
- 0.9611 
(0.0098)* 
0.0225 
(0.0058)* 
0.0262 
(0.0060)* 
Age6  (50-54) - 0.7685 
(0.0111)* 
- 0.8026 
(0.0119)* 
0.1249 
(0.0085)* 
0.1389 
(0.0086)* 
Age7  (55-59) - 0.4881 
(0.0105)* 
- 0.4865 
(0.0111)* 
0.4093 
(0.0128)* 
0.4317 
(0.0131)* 
Age8  (≥60) - 0.2342 
(0.0095)* 
- 0.2259 
(0.0095)* 
0.8449 
(0.0236)* 
0.8689 
(0.0231)* 
Edu1 (basic general) 0.9963 
(0.0160) 
1.0129 
(0.0179) 
-0.0073 
(0.0100) 
-0.0107 
(0.0095) 
Edu3 (junior professional) 1.0522 
 (0.0129)* 
1.0312 
 (0.0132)* 
-0.0174  
(0.0073)* 
-0.0184  
(0.0075)* 
Edu4 (secondary professional) - 0.9098 
 (0.1275) 
- 0.8955 
 (0.1254) 
0.0627  
(0.0795) 
0.0559 
(0.0064) 
Edu5 (high professional,   
university) 
- 0.9142 
 (0.1281) 
- 0.9035 
 (0.1264) 
0.0577  
(0.0795) 
0.0547 
(0.0.639) 
Edu7 (additional professional) - 0.6662  
(0.1171)* 
- 0.8068  
(0.1387) 
0.1219  
(0.0977) 
0.1841 
(0.0922)* 
Experience during the last year 
before entering registry 
1.0086  
(0.0012)* 
1.0045  
(0.0012)* 
-0.0026 
 (0.0007)* 
0.0021 
 (0.0007)* 
Total lifetime experience  -0.9979 
 (0.0004)* 
-0.9976 
 (0.0004)* 
0.0013  
(0.0002)* 
0.0015  
(0.0002)* 
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Marital status 1 (married) 1.0598  
(0.0126)* 
1.0625  
(0.0133)* 
-0.0344  
(0.0071)* 
-0.0375  
(0.0071)* 
Marital status 3 
(divorced/widow) 
1.0496 
(0.0159)* 
1.0416 
(0.0165)* 
-0.0232  
(0.0090)* 
-0.0353  
(0.0091)* 
Dummy for having one 
dependant 
-0.7096 
(0.0082)* 
-0.6750 
(0.0079)* 
0.2233 
(0.0067)* 
0.2142 
(0.0069)* 
Dummy for having two 
dependants 
-0.7141 
(0.0117)* 
-0.6800 
(0.0112)* 
0.2191 
(0.0094)* 
0.2180 
(0.0098)* 
Dummy for having no 
dependants 
-0.8031 
(0.0079)* 
-0.7736 
(0.0081)* 
0.1458 
(0.0059)* 
0.1254 
(0.0059)* 
Dummy for those with the 
status of the unemployed 
- 0.2238  
(0.0035)* 
- 0.1725  
(0.0032)* 
0.9982 
 (0.0090)* 
1.1000 
 (0.0073)* 
Type 1 of non-employment (got 
redundant)  
- 0.7547  
(0.0076)* 
- 0.7569  
(0.0077)* 
0.1582 
 (0.0058)* 
0.1911 
 (0.0061)* 
Type 3 of non-employment 
(long-term not employed)  
1.0391  
(0.0157)* 
1.0241  
(0.0167) 
-0.0135  
(0.0093) 
-0.0053  
(0.0092) 
Type 4 of non-employment 
(never worked before)  
- 0.8691  
(0.1862) 
- 0.7997  
(0.2190) 
0.1270 
 (0.1556) 
0.0111 
 (0.1148) 
Dummy for getting registered 
after 1998 crises 
1.1575  
(0.0095)* 
1.1355  
(0.0095)* 
-0.0722  
(0.0047)* 
-0.0822  
(0.0049)* 
Dummy for being registered for 
more than 12 months 
0.0000  
 
- 0.1384  
(0.0012)* 
1.1233  
(0.0057)* 
1.3104 
(0.0049)* 
Dummy for state sector of 
previous employment  
0.9897  
(0.0084) 
-0.9808  
(0.0085)* 
0.0109  
(0.0049)* 
0.0075  
(0.0051) 
Interaction variable (Senior 
ages&Low qualification) 
0.9414 
 (0.1319) 
0.9371 
 (0.1312) 
0.3690 
 (0.0795) 
0.0328 
 (0.0639) 
Dummies for sector of previous 
employment  
Significant sectors are listed 
agric. (-) 
transp.(-) 
commun..(+) 
health (+) 
culture (-) 
defence(-) 
agric. (-) 
transp.(-) 
comm..(+) 
health (+) 
credit (-) 
defence(-) 
culture (-) 
agric. (+) 
transp.(+) 
comm..(-) 
health (-) 
credit (+) 
defence(+) 
culture (-) 
agric. (+) 
transp.(+) 
comm..(-) 
health (-) 
credit (+) 
defence(+) 
 
Dummy for high concentration 
ratio (using Herfindahl index of 
5 largest (by employment) 
enteprises in the municipality) 
 
-0.9400 
(0.0136)* 
 
-0.9177 
(0.0127)* 
 
0.0488 
(0.0079)* 
 
0.0645 
(0.0094* 
Constant   2.3092  
(0.0813)* 
1.8642  
(0.0653)* 
Sigma    0.7559  
(0.0022)* 
P parameter  1.7603 
(0.0057) 
1.7602 
(0.0057) 
 
Log Likelihood -791129 -120550 -120550 -120451 
Wald chi2 (42) /(41 for Cox) 
(Prob>chi2) 
15539 
(0.0000) 
65039 
(0.0000) 
80213 
(0.0000) 
173858 
(0.0000) 
Number of observations 137077 137077 137077 137077 
Note: Robust estimates are reported; standard errors in parentheses; * - statistically significant at 1% level  
Reference categories for dummy variables are as follows: males for gender; age category 4 (30-39 years 
old); education category 2 (general secondary education); marital status 2 (not married); 2nd type of non-
employment (lost job); economic sector of previous employment 1 (industry). 
^^  Note that lognormal model is estimated in accelerated failure time mode.  
 
• Controlling for the sector of previous employment, it turns out that being 
associated with agriculture and transport worsens chances to exit 
unemployment, as compared to industry, while working in the sectors of 
communal service and healthcare adds to the chances.  The results seem to be in 
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line with the recent trends in sectors’ development. What is a bit surprising are 
negative (and significant) signs for credit and finance.  A plausible explanation 
could be the higher incentives to stay in the registry to collect benefits, which 
could be rather high in this case. 
• Type of ownership of the enterprise of last employment turns out to be 
statistically significant for males. Hence, there appears to be a “premium” in 
terms of higher exit rate for males with experience at private enterprise, though 
there is no such ‘premium’ for females. 
• The configuration of the local labor market does matter: those living in 
municipalities with highly concentrated labor market tend to have longer 
unemployment spells. Moreover, there is certain symmetry in the relationship: 
those in municipalities with low labor market concentration have relatively 
higher exit rates from unemployment to employment. The results are rather 
intuitive since, controlling for other factors, having more options in terms of 
alternative employers facilitates job finding.     
• The specifics of the unemployment benefit provision scheme (see Appendix) 
explain why we introduced the dummy for being in the registry for more than a 
year.  It turns out to be highly significant and negative: those who stay in the 
registry for more than a year have lower chances to find jobs.  
• Since the period under study covers years 1996-2000, it was interesting to check 
whether the financial crises of August 1998 had affected the unemployment  
spells' duration. Our results suggest that the hazard rate became higher after 
1998, implying that it either became easier to find a job, and/or those 
unemployed became more ready to accept jobs.   
• When estimating Weibull proportional hazard model, we obtained the so-called 
basic hazard function which shows how the chances to get out of unemployment 
are related to the duration of the spell itself. We find that the dependence is 
positive (in Weibull specification p coefficient is higher than 1), thus suggesting 
that the longer you are in the registry, the higher are your chances to get out of 
unemployment independent of your individual characteristics (simply because 
you are in the registry for so long). The result seems to be in line with standard 
search model prediction: the sooner the date the benefits stop being paid, the 
higher are effort, and hence, chances to get out of the registry.   
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When the sample is divided into male and female sub-samples, and the estimations are 
done for the sub-samples separately, some peculiarities of gender-related patterns could 
be identified. In particular, as is seen from Table 6, 
• There are some differences in male/female patterns with respect to the influence 
of age on unemployment duration: males of 25-29 age group tend to have 
shorter unemployment spells as compared to 30-39 age group, while there is no 
such effect for females; moreover, males of 40-49 age group are not disfavoured 
in contrast to females of the same age group.   
• Entering the registry (and in this sense the labour force) after a long break (long-
term not employed) or for the first time (those who never worked before) results 
in higher chances to exit unemployment for females, while being not significant 
for males.  
• Having work experience with state (as opposed to private) enterprise brings 
negative premium for males but not for females. 
• There are certain male/female asymmetries with respect to the influence of 
sector of last employment (having experience with sales and catering, education 
and healthcare is ‘beneficial’ for females and ‘unhelpful’ for males).  
 
 
Table 6. Estimation of proportional hazard models for the sample of non-employed 
registered at the FES, 1996-2000, separate for males and females 
Explanatory  
                      Variables 
Hazard rate Hazard rate Hazard rate Hazard rate 
 MALES FEMALES 
  Weibull model  Cox model Weibull model  Cox model 
Age1  (16-19) 1.1249  
(0.0953) 
1.1018  
(0.0832) 
1.4568  
(0.0796)* 
1.3598  
(0.0724)* 
Age2  (20-24) 1.2133  
(0.0329)* 
1.2100  
(0.0308)* 
1.1067  
(0.0225)* 
1.0854  
(0.0213)* 
Age3  (25-29) 1.0831 
(0.0226)* 
1.0860 
(0.0219)* 
1.0128 
(0.0169) 
-0.9236 
(0.0117) 
Age5  (40-49) - 0.9707 
(0.0163) 
- 0.9723 
(0.0198) 
- 0.9437 
(0.0122)* 
- 0.9236 
(0.0118)* 
Age6  (50-54) - 0.8763 
(0.0211)* 
- 0.8626 
(0.0199)* 
- 0.7379 
(0.0141)* 
- 0.6975 
(0.0129)* 
Age7  (55-59) - 0.7123 
(0.0187)* 
- 0.6868 
(0.0174)* 
- 0.1842 
(0.0096)* 
- 0.1976 
(0.0098)* 
Age8  (≥60) - 0.2312 
(0.0112)* 
- 0.2319 
(0.0109)* 
- 0.2082 
(0.0189)* 
- 0.2391 
(0.0205)* 
Edu1 (basic general) 1.0048 
(0.0234) 
-0.9883 
(0.0213) 
1.0130 
(0.0252) 
-0.9966 
(0.0233) 
Edu3 (junior professional) 1.0345 
 (0.0202) 
1.0442 
 (0.0193)* 
1.0287 
 (0.0172) 
1.0569 
 (0.0171)* 
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Edu4 (secondary professional) 1.2114 
 (0.2416) 
1.4354 
 (0.2893) 
1.1049 
 (0.1278) 
1.3564 
 (0.1728)* 
Edu5 (high professional,   
university) 
1.2067 
 (0.2405) 
1.4244 
 (0.2871) 
1.1277 
 (0.1306) 
1.3744 
 (0.1729)* 
Edu6 (post-graduate) 1.5592 
(0.3561)* 
1.8593 
(0.4286)* 
-0.9703 
(0.2662) 
1.1559 
(0.3140) 
Experience during the last year 
before entering registry 
1.0072 
(0.0020)* 
1.0109 
(0.0019)* 
1.0034 
(0.0016)* 
1.0072 
(0.0015)* 
Total lifetime experience  -0.9992 
 (0.0006) 
-0.9995 
 (0.0006) 
-0.9983 
 (0.0005)* 
-0.9984 
 (0.0005)* 
Marital status 1 (married) 1.1186  
(0.0224)* 
1.1211  
(0.0210)* 
1.0123  
(0.0161) 
1.0057  
(0.0154) 
Marital status 3 
(divorced/widow) 
-0.9890 
(0.0253) 
-0.9979 
(0.0245) 
1.0689 
(0.0217)* 
1.0728 
(0.0207)* 
Dummy for having one 
dependant 
-0.6779 
(0.0139)* 
-0.7052 
(0.0143)* 
-0.6692 
(0.0096)* 
-0.7063 
(0.0099)* 
Dummy for having two 
dependants 
-0.6998  
(0.0215)* 
-0.7237  
(0.0222)* 
-0.6634  
(0.0132)* 
-0.7001  
(0.0136)* 
Dummy for having no 
dependants 
-0.7852  
(0.0122)* 
-0.8108  
(0.0119)* 
-0.7839  
(0.0109)* 
-0.8141  
(0.0108)* 
Dummy for those with the 
status of the unemployed 
- 0.1823  
(0.0045)* 
- 0.2264  
(0.0047)* 
- 0.1590  
(0.0045)* 
- 0.2120  
(0.0049)* 
Type 1 of non-employment (got 
redundant)  
- 0.7018  
(0.0118)* 
- 0.7089  
(0.0118)* 
- 0.8061  
(0.0102)* 
- 0.7974  
(0.0101)* 
Type 3 of non-employment 
(long-term not employed)  
-0.9808  
(0.0255) 
-1.0012  
(0.0240) 
1.0587  
(0.0221)* 
1.0662  
(0.0207)* 
Type 4 of non-employment 
(never worked before)  
-0.6735  
(0.2184) 
-0.7519  
(0.1989) 
1.6291  
(0.4221)* 
1.5029  
(0.4302) 
Dummy for getting registered 
after 1998 crises 
1.1977  
(0.0162)* 
1.1991  
(0.0156)* 
1.0984  
(0.0117)* 
1.1343  
(0.0119)* 
Dummy for being registered for 
more than 12 months 
-0.1419 
(0.0023)* 
0.0000 -0.1303 
(0.0014)* 
0.0000 
Dummy for state sector of 
previous employment  
-0.9568  
(0.0131)* 
-0.9681  
(0.0127)* 
0.9999  
(0.0113) 
1.0049  
(0.0111) 
Interaction variable (Senior 
ages&Low qualification) 
1.2597 
 (0.2509) 
1.4652 
 (0.2992)* 
1.1692 
 (0.1352) 
1.4154 
 (0.1778)* 
Dummies for sector of previous 
employment  
Significant sectors are listed 
agric. (-) 
transp.(-) 
communal .(+) 
sales (-) 
manag.(-) 
culture (-) 
insurance (-) 
defence(-) 
 
agric.(-) 
transp.(-) 
communal .(+) 
sales (-) 
manag.(-) 
culture (-) 
insurance (-) 
defence(-) 
 
agric. (-) 
transp.(-) 
communal.(+) 
sales (+) 
health (+) 
educ (+) 
credit (-) 
defence(-) 
 
agric. (-) 
transp.(-) 
communal.(+) 
sales (+) 
health (+) 
educ (+) 
credit (-) 
defence(-) 
 
Dummy for high concentration 
ratio (using Herfindahl index of 
5 largest (by employment) 
enteprises in the municipality) 
 
-0.8927 
(0.0188)* 
 
-0.9009 
(0.0197)* 
 
-0.9576 
(0.0174)* 
 
-0.9869 
(0.0187)* 
P parameter 1.6441 
 (0.0080) 
 1.8623 
 (0.0077) 
 
Log Likelihood -49200 -291028 -70483 -448483 
Wald chi2 (46) /(45 for Cox) 
(Prob>chi2) 
22739 
(0.0000) 
7487 
(0.0000) 
41823 
(0.0000) 
7834 
(0.0000) 
Number of observations 52752 52752 84325 84325 
Note: Robust estimates are reported; standard errors in parentheses; * - statistically significant at 1% level  
Reference categories for dummy variables are as follows: age category 4 (30-39 years old); education 
category 2 (general secondary education); marital status 2 (not married); three and more dependants; 2nd 
type of non-employment (lost job); economic sector of previous employment 1 (industry). 
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5. Conclusions 
  
 
The study we attempted sheds some light on the pool of registered unemployed in 
Russia (on the example of Voronezh province). We managed to test some basic 
hypothesis on the influence of individual attributes (demographic; those, related to the 
accumulated human capital, general and specific; those, related to the regulatory 
framework) on the hazard ratios, and hence, on duration of unemployment.  
We’ve got some interesting results with respect to the influence of various types of 
education (controlling for other factors) on the unemployment spell duration. In 
particular, our results are in favour of non-linear influence of education on 
unemployment spell: higher education does not increase your chances to exit 
unemployment; it is rather junior professional education which facilitates employment.  
We also got support to the gender and age differentials in unemployment duration, and 
identified some peculiarities of male and female patterns of unemployment spells. Our 
results point to gender asymmetries with respect to senior people employment that 
could be an indication of discrimination practices.  
There appears to be a “premium” in terms of higher exit rate for males with experience 
at private enterprise, but not for females, while the configuration of the local labor 
market does matter for both: those living in municipalities with highly concentrated 
labor market tend to have longer unemployment spells. 
The duration of the spell itself turns to be significant as well, as Weibull specification 
suggests.  
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 6. Appendix 
 
6.1 Unemployment Benefit Provision  
Only individuals who are officially registered as unemployed with an employment 
centre can be eligible for unemployment benefits.8  Unemployment benefit is 
conditional on the individual making genuine efforts to look for new employment and 
being available for work.  Children under 16, retired individuals who receive normal 
retirement pension, and individuals, who did not register as job-seekers or refused to 
accept two suitable9 job offers within 10 days after registration, cannot be registered as 
unemployed.10  Registered unemployed are required to reregister at least twice a month.  
Benefits to individuals, who failed to reregister, or refused to take 2 suitable jobs, or 
were dismissed for infractions of work discipline, can be suspended for a period of up to 
3 months.  The benefits can be decreased by 25% if an individual did not show up for an 
interview with an employer within 3 days or if an individual failed to show up in the 
employment office for job posting. 
For individuals, who worked for at least 26 weeks (out of 52) during the last 12 months 
before they became unemployed, benefits are equal to 75% of their average wage in the 
first three months of unemployment, 60% in the next four months, and 45% afterwards. 
However, the benefits cannot be lower than the minimum wage and cannot exceed the 
regional average wage.  
The size of benefits paid to all other categories (i.e., those who worked for less than 26 
weeks in the last 12 months before becoming unemployed, those who are seeking for a 
job for the first time and have no skills, or those unemployed for more than 1 year) is set 
at the level of the minimum wage.11  
The size of benefits increases by ½ of the minimum wage for each dependent unable to 
work, but not by more than 1.2 minimal wages in total.  If both parents are unemployed, 
each of them qualify for additional benefits for children. 
                                                 
8 There are several ways of being registered with the employment agency:  
1. Initial registration, which is used to compute the number of people interested in getting a 
job, and does not require any document be submitted. 
2. Registration as a job-searcher (the individual registered as a job searcher does not need to 
be unemployed). 
3. Registration as an unemployed. 
9 A temporary job is also considered as suitable. 
10 A disabled individual can only be registered as unemployed if he/she has work certificate. 
11 As usual, additional benefits are paid to individuals, who received radiation after Chernobyl 
or other catastrophes. 
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Unemployment benefits cannot be provided to an unemployed person for more than 12 
months in 18 consecutive calendar months.  
 
6.2 Social Assistance to the Unemployed 
A person registered as unemployed who has not found a job in 12 months, qualifies for 
social assistance from the Employment Fund if the average per capita income in his/her 
family does not exceed two minimum wages, and if he/she re-registers as unemployed 
as often as the rules require, and if he/she is immediately available for work.  Social 
assistance can include monthly or one-off payments, subsidies for kindergartens, 
housing, utilities, transport, health care and catering.  The amount of subsidies is 
regulated on the regional level according to regional standards.12 
The monthly social assistance payment should not be higher than the minimum wage.  
The size of one-off cash payments is limited to 2 minimal wages. An unemployed 
person who ceases to be eligible for unemployment benefit because his/her 
unemployment spell has lasted too long, can receive social assistance payments for a 
period of up to 6 months.  The dependents of an unemployed person can receive social 
assistance for a maximum of 12 months.  
Unemployment benefits are administered by the formerly independent Federal 
Employment Service, which now reports to the Employment Policy Department of the 
Ministry of Labour.  The FES registers the unemployed, directs them to job vacancies 
offered by employers, pays unemployment benefits to the unemployed and arranges 
professional re-training.  In addition, there is the Federal Migration Service (FMS), 
responsible for providing mortgages and housing construction for migrants within 
Russia. 
                                                 
12 For example, there are regulations on the maximum size of the apartments to get housing 
subsidies, or minimal length of the commute to the employment center, and so on. 
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Graph 4 
 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by education 
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Graph 5 
 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by age 
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Graph 6 
 Survival estimates, before and after Aug98 
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